The B-2 "Spirit" Bomber

In the 1994 Defense Authorization Act, Congress capped the B-2 bomber program at 20 planes, down from the 132 stealthy bombers that the Air Force initially wanted to attack the Soviet Union. Congress also capped spending for this costly program at $28,968 million in 1981 dollars (currently equal to $44,656 million in then-year dollars).¹ Through FY 1994, the Congress has appropriated $39,639.7 million.¹ The last of these 20 bombers is to be produced in FY 1997 and delivered to the Air Force in FY 2000.

Estimated Cost of the First 20 B-2 Bombers

	Cost for 20 B-2s (Then-Year $)	Cost per Plane (Then-Year $)
Program Acquisition Cost (RDT&E and procurement)	$44.65 Billion	$2.2 Billion2
Life Cycle Cost (RDT&E, procurement, operations and support)	$49.9 Billion3	$2.5 Billion4

Still Paying for the First 20 B-2s

Program Cost	Actual FY 19955	Request FY 19966	Estimated FY 19965	Request FY 19975
Procurement -- Item	$345.1 million	$279.9 million	$742.5 million	$216.9 million
Procurement -- Spares	$2.2 million	$59.1 million	$58.7 million	$122.2 million
RDT&E	$365.5 million	$623.6 million	$589.2 million	$446.2 million
Military Construction	$23.2 million	$24.6 million	$24.6 million	$5.4 million
Total7	$736.0 million	$987.2 million	$1,415.0 million	$790.7 million

Gearing up for 20 More B-2 Bombers

The Pentagon spent $4.5 million in 1995,⁸ as directed by Congress, to determine whether or not additional B-2s were needed to meet operational requirements -- that is the ability to fight two wars simultaneously, without any help from allies -- and to preserve the bomber industrial base - that is the ability to produce more bombers down the road should we choose to do so. Both studies concluded that no additional B-2 bombers were needed. Republican leaders in Congress, however, are determined that the Pentagon will buy additional B-2 bombers, needed or not.

The President has not requested funds to buy B-2 bombers beyond the 20 previously authorized, nor has he requested funds to preserve the bomber industrial base.⁹ The President directed that the $493 million that Congress added to the FY 1996 Defense Appropriations Bill for additional B-2s be used to modify a B-2 prototype bomber to the operational configuration, bringing the projected B-2 force to 21 combat-ready bombers.¹⁰

The first 20 B-2 bombers cost $2.2 Billion each. Because money spent on research and development are sunk costs, additional bombers would cost a mere $690 million each, according to the manufacturer. The Air Force, however, estimates the full cost (including operations and maintenance costs) of each new B-2 at approximately $1.5 billion. An additional 20 B-2s would cost a total of at least $30 Billion over a projected 20 year lifespan.

Projected Cost of 20 More B-2 Bombers

Costs	Cost of 20 B-2s (Then-Year $)	Cost per B-2 (Then-Year $)
Flyaway Cost	$11.4 Billion11	$570 million
Program Acquisition Cost	$13.8 Billion3	$690 million
Life Cycle Cost	$30.4 Billion12	$1.5 Billion

The B-2 program was initiated in 1981. The program, however, remained in the Pentagon's "Black Budget" until the mid-1980s. Hidden from public scrutiny and congressional oversight, the cost of the B-2 program has risen dramatically over the years. There is historical reason to believe that the $1.5 Billion price tag will escalate.

Escalating Costs of the B-2

Year	Number of Bombers	Total Estimated Program Cost	Estimated Cost per B-2
1986	133	$58.2 Billion13	$437 million
June 1989	133	$70.2 Billion13	$528 million
early 1990	133	$75.4 Billion13	$567 million
April 1990	75	$61.1 Billion13	$820 million
1994	20	$44.65 Billion1	$2.2 Billion

Bomber Missions

Supporters of the B-2 argue that additional B-2s are needed to give the United States the ability to destroy targets halfway around the world from bases in the continental United States. The Congressional Budget Office found, however, that "although bombers can fly missions directly from the United States, it is difficult to sustain such operations for a long period."¹⁴ While it may take longer to get Naval forces with conventional sea-launched cruise missiles and fighter planes carrying stand-off missiles in place, these weapons can attack from a distance and maintain a quick pace. Even in the unlikely event that the U.S. Air Force could not find a place in-theater to base its fighter aircraft, the Navy's 11 aircraft carriers and large supply of sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) would allow the United States to strike repeatedly from long range.

The B-2's mission does not require the ability to sustain an attack. Originally designed to destroy any intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) left standing in an all-out nuclear war with the Soviet Union, the B-2 is now justified as a dual-capable bomber, capable of delivering both nuclear and conventional weapons. The dual-capable B-2 is to act as a "silver bullet," flying through enemy radar during the early hours of a war to destroy key targets such as communications facilities and radar sites. This is the same role played by the F-117 stealth fighter during the Gulf War. Given the performance of the F-117, the capabilities of other stand-off weapons (precision guided missiles on fighter aircraft and sea-launched cruise missiles based on naval ships), and the arsenal of 21 B-2s, there is no need to buy additional B-2s to perform this "silver bullet" mission.

The Decreasing Role for Nuclear Bombers

Bomber	Number in Service Today	Projected Number in Service 2003
B-52G/H "Stratofortress"	94 bombers	66 bombers
B-1B "Lancer"	95 bombers	convert to conventional missions
B-2 "Spirit"	10 bombers	21 dual-capable bombers

Enhancing the Bomber Force

Instead of buying additional B-2 bombers for $30 Billion, there are readily available, less expensive options to increase the size and capabilities of the bomber force, according to Pentagon and Congressional Budget Office studies.^14,15 Keeping all 94 B-52 bombers at a cost of $3.1 Billion (FY 96 dollars) would have an immediate impact on the size of the force whereas buying additional B-2s would not fully affect the size of the force until at least 2008. Improving bomber capabilities, not number of bombers, and buying more precision-guided weapons for the bombers to carry would significantly improve the bomber force. The projected cost through 2020 is a mere $1.3 Billion (FY 96 dollars). Stockpile spares and support equipment could also be deployed at a few key forward bases. According to CBO, this option "could provide more B-2 sorties and deliver more weapons than a force with 20 additional B-2s during the critical first five days and during the first 15 days of conflict" at a cost through 2020 of $1.8 Billion (FY 96 dollars).¹⁴

The Pentagon is currently studying the total mix of platforms and munitions required to meet operational requirements. Unlike previous studies which considered bombers vs. bombers, this study will look at the bigger picture including the roles, tradeoffs, and cost-effectiveness of bombers, aircraft carriers, fighter aircraft, and cruise missiles. It is expected to be completed in early 1997.¹⁶

CDI Conclusions

Given the demise of the Soviet Union, the planned reductions in the already large bomber force, and the availability of F-117 stealth fighters, there is no need for the United States to commit precious resources for additional B-2 bombers. The President's plan not to buy additional B-2 bombers, based on the recommendations of two Pentagon studies, should be honored by Congress.

Notes & Sources:

1. "B-2 Bomber: Cost to Complete 20 Aircraft is Uncertain," General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-94-217, September 1994.
   
2. Each plane is worth four times its weight in gold.
   
3. Defense Week, 5 July 1994.
   
4. "B-2 Bomber: Status of Cost, Development, and Production," General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-95-164, August 1995.
   
5. Numbers taken from FY 1997 Program Acquisition Costs by Weapon System, Department of Defense, March 1996.
   
6. Numbers taken from FY 1996-7 Program Acquisition Costs by Weapon System, Department of Defense, March 1995.
   
7. The author has chosen to use numbers from PACWS (see endnotes #5 and #6) for this chart, in order to compare 3 years of actual, estimated, and requested spending plans using the same accounting methods and terms. It is important to note that the numbers given in PACWS frequently differ from those in Defense Appropriations Bills and Reports (e.g. according to the FY 1996-7 PACWS, the President was requesting $987.2 million for the B-2 bomber program, but using Defense Appropriations figures, the President was only requesting $921 million. It was to this latter figure that Congress added $493 million.) The discrepancy is due to accounting procedures. PACWS includes procurement of spares and military construction whereas the Defense Appropriations figures, based on the Procurement-1 (P-1) and RDT&E-1 (R-1) documents also distributed by the Pentagon, do not. The Defense Appropriations numbers do, unlike PACWS, include money allocated for modifications to a given weapon. If one were to add up all the categories (procurement of items and spares, RDT&E, modifications, and military construction), total appropriations for FY 1996 for the B-2 total $1,004.7 million. (Neither PACWS nor information from Defense Appropriations include money spent on operating and maintaining the weapon system once acquired.)
   
8. DoD News Briefing by Captain Mike Doubleday, 8 February 1996.
   
9. Statement by the Press Secretary, B-2 Bomber Review, 8 February 1996.
   
10. Aerospace Daily, 22 March 1996.
    
11. Defense Week, 6 February 1996.
    
12. Aerospace Daily, 10 August 1994, citing CBO.
    
13. "Strategic Weapons: Long-Term Costs Are Not Reported to the Congress," General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-90-226, August 1990.
    
14. "Options for Enhancing the Bomber Force: Summary," Congressional Budget Office, June 1995.
    
15. Aerospace Daily, 21 June 1995, 13 July 1995; Dod News Briefing with Dr. Paul G. Kaminski and Press Release #237-95, 3 May 1995.
    
16. Statement by the Press Secretary, B-2 Bomber Review, 8 February 1996; Transcript of Press Briefing with Robert Bell, Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control at the National Security Council, 8 February 1996.

Prepared by Kathryn R. Schultz, Senior Research Analyst, 1 May 1996.

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Penulis : Drs.Simon Arnold Julian Jacob

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