HOW EFFECTIVE IS AUSTRALIA POLICY

How Effective is Australian Policy?

The 1974 MOU recognises some form of traditional fishing rights and attempts to regulate access for traditional Indonesian fishermen in an area now under Australian control. However, in the words of Fox (1998: 114), ‘numerous problems have arisen as a result of this seemingly well-intended endeavour’ and led to a succession of ‘unintended consequences’.

The MOU does not specifically identify who is allowed access into the MOU area. Rather, access is open to any Indonesian ‘traditional’ fishermen as long as they comply with the regulations which narrowly define ‘traditional’ methods and vessels. Access is not determined by historically recognised use rights for specific groups who operated in the region prior to Australian maritime expansion; any group of fishermen using a sail-powered boat is allowed to fish in the region. By failing to identify the specific groups who historically accessed the AFZ, the effectiveness and original intention of the MOU has been undermined and its outcomes severely attenuated.

The original purpose of excluding the use of motorised vessels and methods in the face of increasing motorisation in the small-scale perahu sector in Indonesia was to limit the number of boats entering the area. This policy was designed to control the level of resource exploitation and therefore function as a form of resource management. The idea was that if the technology was unsophisticated or ‘primitive’ it could offer some protection for marine resources. But this technological freeze has failed to achieve the desired outcome. By not restricting the numbers of vessels or the amount of product taken, it opened the area up to an unlimited number of fishermen in sail-powered vessels, of which there is no shortage in eastern Indonesia, and this has resulted in over-exploitation of resources in the MOU box area, particularly sedentary species on reefs and inshore waters.

By not permitting the use of motorised vessels in times of bad weather, the Government has also been accused of enforcing a policy that subjects the fishermen to unnecessary risks (Campbell and Wilson 1993; Fox 1998: 121). Over the last decade, a number of sailing boats and their crews have been lost during cyclones in the MOU area. For example, in April 1994, four Pepela-owned boats and their mostly Bajo crews drowned during a cyclone in the Timor Sea. On the other hand, in periods of little or no wind, or strong currents, when it is impossible to make any headway in a sail-powered vessel, strong currents can easily drag a sail-powered vessel beyond the permitted areas.

Legal fishing in the MOU box area can also be seen as a gateway to illegal fishing (Fox 1998). The 1989 amendments that created this area did not incorporate the most productive Bajo shark fishing grounds. Apart from a few areas around reefs and islands and along the edges of the MOU box, it is a relatively poor shark fishing ground (Wallner and McLoughlin 1995a: 34). No motorised Type 3 perahu have been apprehended for illegal shark fishing activity in this area. 

Butonese and Bajo fishermen from across eastern Indonesia who use motorised boats to target shark prefer to concentrate their activities in the more productive waters to the north and east of the MOU box (ibid.). Bajo fishermen often seek access to these waters by passing through the MOU box, but in doing so they run the risk of apprehension. Fishermen are forced to fish illegally outside the MOU box area in an attempt to secure adequate returns. Illegal fishing and boat apprehensions thus occur in direct response to the ineffectiveness of the MOU itself.

Naturally, the borders of the MOU box area cannot be marked or signposted. They only exist as lines on maps, unconnected to any geographical features. Bajo navigation is based on reference to familiar landmarks and sea features. Their sailing and fishing activities have, until recently, never been confined to areas bounded by lines on maps. Even for the most experienced navigators, it is difficult to determine exactly where the boundaries of the MOU box are. 

The MOU restricts access to fishermen using ‘traditional methods’ but expects the accuracy of modern navigation. Accurate determination of latitude and longitude requires the use of marine charts and sophisticated navigational equipment such as a Global Positioning System. Prior to the early 1990s, fishermen found within an unspecified reasonable distance of the permitted areas were generally warned but not apprehended. The tougher approach adopted by AFMA in recent years has seen Bajo and other fishermen apprehended as little as 5–8 nm outside the MOU box. 

Fishermen who are denied the use of motors and sophisticated equipment under the MOU are treated in the same fashion as an industrial foreign fishing vessel worth millions of dollars caught illegally fishing in the AFZ.

Neither the 1974 MOU nor the Plan of Management for Ashmore Reef National Nature Reserve (ANPWS 1989) makes any mention of this reef’s cultural heritage value. 

At least eight Indonesian graves have been identified on West Island and others on East and Middle islets (ANPWS n.d.), and fishermen are officially prohibited from landing on the islands to visit these sites. ^[5] However, formal requests by fishermen are made to the caretaker to obtain permission to visit and maintain the graves, perform ceremonies and present offerings, and the caretaker often accompanies the fishermen on these visits (personal communication, Paul Clark, 1999).

Indonesian fishermen have played no role in shaping the MOU itself. The agreement makes some attempt at recognising their rights but they have not been invited or allowed to participate in its formulation or implementation. They are not alone, for the interests of maritime peoples are often ‘ignored, dismissed or marginalised’ (Schug 1996: 210) in the formulation of international maritime boundaries and agreements designed to protect their livelihood. 

The case of the indigenous people of the Torres Strait is one example: the boundaries between Papua New Guinea and Australia established under the Torres Strait Treaty were developed ‘without sufficient consultation with the people who would be affected most directly by the political division’, and this has ‘created an unstable situation which threatens to undermine intention the Treaty’s efforts to provide for the protection of the Strait’s marine environment’ (ibid.: 222). 

In the case of the MOU, dialogue may be effective at a government-to-government level but other stakeholders, such as Indonesian fishermen, are unable to participate.

The Australian Aid Program

Included in the minutes of the meeting between Australian and Indonesian government officials in April 1989 is a provision which states that:

Indonesian and Australian officials agreed to make arrangements for cooperation in developing alternative income projects in Eastern Indonesia for traditional fishermen traditionally engaged in fishing under the MOU. The Indonesian side indicated they might include mariculture and nucleus fishing enterprise scheme (Perikanan Inti Rakyat or P.I.R.). Both sides mutually decided to discuss the possibility of channelling Australian aid funds to such projects with appropriate authorities in their respective countries.

The ‘nucleus fishing enterprise scheme’ is a transmigration program in the fisheries sector which is used to shift the rural and/or fishing population from densely populated areas to those islands where population density is low. No Australian aid was subsequently directed to the Bajo fishermen who operate in the AFZ, and it was not until the late 1990s that any official Australian delegations visited the villages of Mola, Mantigola or Pepela. The idea of direct engagement with fishermen and an understanding of the issues from their point of view appeared to be completely alien to the Australian authorities.

The educational and information tours undertaken by Australian officials to eastern Indonesia in 1995 were in response to high levels of incursion into the AFZ in 1994. During the visits, maps were distributed in an effort to explain the complex maritime jurisdictions existing between Australia and Indonesia in the Timor and Arafura seas and the MOU area. 

These were accompanied by two handouts in Indonesian entitled Pesan Permerintah Australia untuk Nelayan (‘Message for Fishermen from the Australian Government’) and Pesan Pemerintah Australia untuk Pemilik Perahu/Kapal dan Otorita Pelabuhan (‘Message for Perahu/Boat Owners andHarbour Authorities from the Australian Government’).^[6] The Australian authorities seem to think that their maps are readily understood by Indonesian fishermen and that they can help them to determine where they can and cannot fish. Fishermen with maps certainly have no excuse if found outside of the permitted areas. 

However, some Bajo captains, especially those who were illiterate, found the maps highly confusing and difficult, if not impossible, to comprehend.

During the course of their awareness-raising tours, officials from the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) did explore the opportunities for delivery of aid to poor isolated fishing communities. As a result AusAID has implemented some small projects, but these have not been directed to fishermen whose activities are covered by the MOU, but to people from Sinjai in South Sulawesi who were apprehended in large numbers in 1994–95 following a wave of illegal trepang fishing activity in the northern part of the AFZ. 

Some support from the Direct Assistance Program of the Australian Ambassador to Indonesia was given to other fishing communities, including Pepela, but the outcome was somewhat ironic. In one instance the money was used to purchase a perahu lambo on the understanding that the proceeds from fishing would be distributed among the community, but the perahu (the Bintang Pagi) was subsequently apprehended, confiscated and destroyed in Darwin.

There is a serious inconsistency here. Australia has a policy commitment to deliver aid to eastern Indonesian fishermen operating under the terms of the MOU, yet retains a policy of confiscating and destroying the sources of livelihood of these very same people. In February 1995, an ABC journalist interviewed a representative from the Australian Embassy in Jakarta and a senior officer from the WA Fisheries Department who had just returned from the first educational tour of eastern Indonesia. 

The embassy representative explained that the Australian Government was exploring opportunities for the delivery of aid for ‘isolated poor fishing communities in eastern Indonesia … who need, for their livelihood, to gain income to support their families and are ready and willing … to often engage in some risky fishing activities south of the border’ (ABC Radio National 1995: 2). In the same interview, the fisheries officer discussed the effectiveness of the deterrence policy:

From our experience … we’ve found the only real deterrent is to continue prosecuting them and to take their boats off them and just fly them home.… I think this is the only real way we can deter them is to continually confiscate and burn their boats, so they lose all their boats and all their fishing equipment, and fly them home back to Indonesia. And just continually do that (ibid.: 5).

As Fox (1998: 131) noted, it is an ‘outright contradiction’ for the Australian Government to fund aid projects to alleviate poverty in eastern Indonesia while burning vessels belonging to some of the poorest inhabitants of the region.

The Record of Apprehensions

For over a decade, the policy of apprehension and confiscation of boats, catch and equipment as a form of deterrent to further illegal activity has been in place. Between 1988 and 1993, there was an overall decline in the number of boat apprehensions, which gave the impression that the policy of apprehension and confiscation was working. 

However, there was a dramatic increase over the course of the next four years, and this included an increase in the apprehension of Type 2 perahu using longline gear (see Figure 8-1). Of the total number of Indonesian boats apprehended between 1975 and 1997, approximately 22 per cent or 134 boats were Type 2 vessels.

Figure 8-1: Total number of boat apprehensions and total number of Type 2 boat apprehensions, 1975–97

The educational and information campaigns of the 1990s seem to have introduced the AFZ to coastal peoples who may not have previously been aware of the existence of the MOU and the permitted areas. The campaigns themselves may therefore have contributed to larger numbers of boats from eastern Indonesia beginning to engage in illegal activity. If we look at the proportion of Bajo Type 2 perahu among the total number of Type 2 perahu apprehended in those years when there were any apprehensions of such vessels, we can see that the proportion declined in those years when the total number of apprehensions suddenly began to increase (Table 8-1). In 1996, when 49 Type 2 perahu were apprehended, only 18 of them were Bajo perahu.

The present enforcement and prosecution approach costs the Australian taxpayer millions of dollars each year. Expenses include the costs of towing the vessels to Darwin or Broome, carrying out immigration, quarantine and customs checks, maintaining crews and vessels until the completion of court hearings, repatriation of fishermen and destruction of forfeited boats. The costs incurred for each apprehension boat crew depend on the length of time the fishermen are detained, and this in turn depends on the prosecution process. ^[7] It is difficult to obtain official government figures on these expenses because there is a reluctance to place such information in the public domain and many different government departments and agencies are involved in the process.

Table 8-1: Total number of Type 2 apprehensions and Bajo Type 2 apprehensions, 1975–97.

Year	Total Type 2	Bajo Type 2
1975	3	3
1980	2	0
1985	5	5
1988	3	0
1990	4	4
1991	5	5
1992	3	3
1993	9	0
1994	12	8
1995	8	1
1996	49	18
1997	31	15
Total	134	62

Source: AFMA Apprehension lists, Northern Territory and Western Australia.

In its submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (JSCFDAT) in 1991, AFMA reported that the costs associated with the apprehension of Indonesian vessels in 1989–90 was A$ 750 499 (Fox 1998: 132). A senior AFMA official has stated that his organisation spent around A$ 3 500 000 on 124 foreign fishing apprehensions, of which 113 were Indonesian, in the financial year 1997/98. This amount included the salaries of 15–20 fisheries officers on AFZ patrolling duties and other fisheries support functions and the costs of caretaking and security operations while fishermen are in detention. 

In Darwin the contracting caretakers receive about A$ 1000 a day from AFMA for each vessel and crew in their care. This amount covers staff salaries and the cost of providing food, medical treatment, and transport for the fishermen who have been detained. Legal Aid lawyers say that the cost of legal representation for the fishermen is also around A$ 1000 a day. 

From Darwin, fishermen are normally repatriated to Kupang on a Merpati flight. A one-way ticket costs A$ 244–319 depending on the time of year. Repatriation from Broome is more expensive. For those few fishermen who are able to pay security bonds and return to Indonesia in their boats, the Australian authorities incur several thousand dollars in additional costs by towing the vessels to the international border.

The effectiveness of the policy of apprehension in deterring illegal activity was questioned by the JSCFDAT in 1993. The committee concluded that was a drop in the price of trochus shell, and not surveillance and enforcement, that had caused a decline in illegal trochus harvesting in the AFZ in the early 1990s. The committee also considered that similar enforcement and prosecution approaches were ‘unlikely to be effective’ against illegal shark fishing while the price of shark fin remained high (JSCFDAT 1993: 129).

http://epress.anu.edu.au/apem/boats/mobile_devices/ch08s02.html

ILLEGAL SHARK FISHING DEVASTATES POPULATIONS IN NORTHERN AUSTRALIA

The MoU BOX

Indonesian fishermen have visited the coasts and offshore reefs of northern Australia for centuries, targeting shark fin, trepang (sea cucumber) and trochus shell. In recognition of this long-standing practice, the Australian and Indonesian governments negotiated a memorandum of understanding (MoU 74) which allows Indonesian fishermen to access 50 000 km² within the Australian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Within this area (called the MoU Box) are six coral reef systems, the northern most of which are Ashmore and Cartier Reefs.

Indonesian fisherman can legally access the resources within the MoU box.

While there has been concern over the status of reef resources in the MoU Box for some time, the condition of shark stocks remains largely unknown. Until recently the most common method of counting mobile marine organisms like sharks and fishes was the underwater visual census (UVC) method, a technique that relies on diver observation and thus restricts the census to relatively shallow waters (usually <20 m depth) for short periods of time.

In order to achieve more accurate census by including sharks in deep water habitats, AIMS uses of a fleet of baited remote underwater video stations (BRUVS) which can be deployed in water as deep as 100m. Using this technique, it is possible to obtain accurate and reliable estimates of the type, number and size of sharks.

In 2003 and 2005, AIMS used BRUVS to survey abundances of sharks at reefs within the MoU Box and at the Rowley Shoals to the south west. The Rowley Shoals reefs are closed to all types of fishing that target sharks. 

Surveys by BRUVS showed a striking difference in the abundance and species richness of sharks between the fished and unfished reefs. When corrected for sampling effort, sharks were on average from 4 to 17 times more abundant at the Rowley Shoals than at most reefs within the MoU Box. Analysis of BRUVS tapes also showed that it took twice as long (up to 50 min more) for sharks to appear at reefs in the MoU Box compared to protected reefs.

While there are signs that some shark species may be recovering at reefs that were once in the MoU Box but are now protected from fishing, there is no evidence of recovery for sharks that are particularly valuable in the fin trade, such as silvertip reef sharks (Carcharhinus albimarginatus), the tiger shark (Galeocerdo cuvier), or hammerhead sharks (Sphyrna lewini and S. mokarran) despite almost 20 years of protection.

The demise of shark stocks in areas open to Indonesian fishing within the EEZ, coupled with an increasing demand for shark fin may account for the major problem of illegal shark fishing on the reefs surrounding the MoU Box and throughout northern Australia. Recent studies of shoals and banks beyond the MoU Box (Sahul and Kharmt Shoals) show that the patterns of shark depletion are being repeated and may be driving illegal fishers further towards the coast of mainland Australia and into the Gulf of Carpentaria.

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STATE-OF-THE-ART AIRBORNE IMAGING PRODUCES THE FIRST DIGITAL MAP OF NINGALOO MARINE PARK

Scientists from AIMS are using new state-of-the-art aerial imaging to produce the world’s most detailed digital map of a coral reef. More than 3400 km² of the pristine Ningaloo Marine Park was surveyed in a collaborative initiative funded by BHP Billiton. The aerial images will be digitally processed and converted into maps that indicate the location of different habitat types in the marine park. These maps will be useful in guiding future research projects and management initiatives in the region.

This project builds on the Western Australian Marine Science Institution (WAMSI) programme to improve understanding of the marine resources of Ningaloo. AIMS lead scientist in WA, Dr Andrew Heyward, said the programme’s first success, the hyperspectral survey, will provide enormous benefits for future scientific studies. "Surveys of this calibre are quite expensive and beyond the fiscal capacity of current research programmes. The BHP Billiton-AIMS effort has lead to the largest aerial survey of its kind, providing collaborating scientists in Western Australia with an opportunity to take a world lead in using this type of data for coral reef understanding and management." 

A BIRD'S EYE VIEW OF THE REEF

Scientists from AIMS are using new state-of-the art aerial imaging to view the reef in a new light. Digital images have been collected for more than 3400 km² of the pristine Ningaloo Marine Park to produce the world’s largest and most detailed digital map of a coral reef.

Using the latest technology, hyperspectral aerial photographs (left) are digitally processed to separate spectral signatures (right) which indicate a variety of marine habitats. 

Photo: Hy Vista

The technology, called hyperspectral imaging uses a highly specialised ‘super camera’ or spectrometer mounted to an aircraft to collect images of the land and sea below. Similar to a bird’s eye, which can detect UV and infrared light, the spectrometer captures 720 more wavelengths than the human eye can see and has a spatial resolution of 3.5 m (from an altitude of 1400 m).

Different substrate and habitat types reflect light differently, each giving off a unique photo-signature or spectral ‘fingerprint’. Sand, for example, is highly reflective, while the deep waters of Ningaloo absorb light. Chlorophyll containing plants and algae have distinctive colour signatures which can indicate areas of high primary productivity (of interest to marine managers). 

By analysing the images, scientists can pinpoint areas dominated by different types of corals and can even identify important oceanographic information such as surface waves.

AIMS scientist and project leader Dr Andrew Heyward explained that the images collect more information than our eyes can see and that even habitats below the surface of the water can be identified from the data.

"The hyperspectral data contains far more information than normal colour photographs and is fully digital, permitting various combinations of spectral signal to be combined or contrasted. 

This enables us to distinguish features not apparent to the naked eye, using computer processing. We take a geographic position on the image and match the colour to the information gathered at the same location underwater to establish the meaning of the colour."

While the aircraft works the aerial perspective, AIMS scientists are busy sampling the seafloor. Information collected from biological surveys including dive expeditions and investigations of deeper waters where researchers use video; sled sampling; and acoustic echo sounders, is cross referenced to the aerial images. Dr Heyward expects the technology to provide a strategy for rapidly identifying habitat types in areas that haven’t yet been physically surveyed.

"If one image depicts a substantial area of pink and purple which we know is an area dense with table corals, where we see these shades elsewhere along the vast tract of the reef, we can assume there are table corals in that region."

The spectral image can also be used to measure water depth and to quantify issues such as sedimentation and run-off, providing scientists with a unique ability to monitor the marine park over time. 

The data collected for Ningaloo will provide a benchmark assessment of the area against which future changes can be measured.

The next step of the project will involve further processing of the images by researchers from Murdoch and Curtin Universities and the production of detailed maps. Creating the maps will be no small feat as each image has 125 bands or channels, each channel records light in 1024 levels (or shades from black (0) to white (1023)) so the total amount of information possible for any one point (or pixel) is 1024¹²⁵. 

The images contain so much information that a specialised computer costing $200 000 is required to process them into maps.

The Minister for Education, Science and Training, the Hon Julie Bishop MP, said that programmes such as these demonstrate how effectively industry, the research sector and the general community can work together, capturing new knowledge to secure our natural heritage into the future.

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FISH SURVEYS DEMONSTRATE BENEFIT OF NEW REEF ZONING PLAN

After more than a decade of surveys on the Great Barrier Reef an AIMS Long-term Monitoring study indicates that the number and size of fishes in ‘no-take’ green zones has nearly doubled in less than two years. This result is exciting news for managers and fishermen alike as the increasing numbers of adult fishes in protected areas are expected to yield offspring which will replenish populations of commercially important fish species on the reef. 

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GREENHOUSE GASSES ARE TURNING THE OCEANS ACIDIC

Rising levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere (mostly CO₂), responsible for global warming, are also changing the acidity of oceanic waters. Researchers from AIMS and the Australian National University have obtained new historical insights into changes in ocean acidity using geochemical information stored in coral skeletons. If current CO₂ emission rates are sustained, corals could be in hot water within the next few decades. 

CORAL GIVES NEW INSIGHT INTO CHANGING OCEAN ACIDITY

Since the beginning of the industrial revolution, greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere (mainly CO₂) have increased by approximately 40%, rising rapidly to a level unprecedented in the last 420000 years. About 30% of the excess CO₂, which is also responsible for global warming, has been absorbed by the world’s oceans. Our seas, however, are approaching their maximum capacity for absorption of CO₂ and they are becoming more acidic then they have been in hundreds of thousands of years.

Massive corals found throughout Australia's tropical waters, act like living libraries with with coral samples providing historical information on weather patterns, water quality and oceanic conditions of the past. Photo: E. Matson

Although the full consequences of increasing ocean acidity are not well understood, marine scientists are particularly concerned about the potential effect on corals, which provide habitat and food for countless tropical species. Increased ocean acidity is likely to reduce the ability of many marine calcifying organisms, including reef-building corals, to produce their skeletons.  

Researchers from AIMS and the Australian National University are looking backwards in time to understand how historical changes in ocean acidity have affected coral growth.

The scientists analysed a core sample from a 300-year-old massive coral on Flinders Reef in the western Coral Sea. The coral’s growth rings were sampled in five-year increments and levels of boron isotopes (which indicate acidity) were measured along with coral calcification (or growth) rates.

Their results, published in the journal Science, showed that ocean acidity at Flinders Reef rose and fell approximately every 55 years coinciding with periodic fluctuations in global climate.

The relatively large variations in seawater acidity detected at Flinders Reef, suggest that in the past, corals may have been resilient to the shorter term effects of ocean acidification on reefs. However, in the coming decades many reefs are likely to experience unnaturally acidic conditions.

Analysis of boron isotopes in corals is providing improved understanding of past responses of coral reefs to increased acidity. 

Historical information is urgently needed to better understand how coral reefs will respond to the continued acidification of the world's oceans. If current acidification rates are maintained, scientists warn that corals could be in a state of emergency within the next few decades - particularly given other threats to reefs such as coral bleaching, declining water quality and overfishing.

http://www3.aims.gov.au/docs/publications/waypoint/002/headlines-04.html

Penulis : Drs.Simon Arnold Julian Jacob