Signature and ratification
Countries that have signed, but not yet ratified — (22) Afghanistan, Bhutan, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iran, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Libya, Liechtenstein, Malawi, Niger, Rwanda, Swaziland, Switzerland, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, United States.
Countries that have not signed — (17) Andorra, Azerbaijan, Ecuador, Eritrea, Israel,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Peru, San Marino, Syria, Tadjikistan, Timor-Leste, Turkey,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Vatican City, Venezuela.
United States non-ratification
The United States strongly objected to the provisions of Part XI of the Convention on several grounds, saying that the treaty is unfavorable to America's economy and
security. The US felt that the provisions of the treaty were not free-market friendly and were designed to favor the economic systems of the Communist states. The US also felt that the provisions might result in the ISA becoming a bloated and expensive bureaucracy due to a combination of large revenues and insufficient control over what the revenues could be used for.
Due to Part XI, the US refused to ratify the UNCLOS, although it expressed agreement with the remaining provisions of the Convention. Even though the United States is
not a party to the treaty, it considers many of the remaining provisions as binding as customary international law.
Revision of the UNCLOS
From 1983 to 1990, the United States accepted all but Part XI as customary
international law, while attempting to establish an alternative regime for exploitation of the minerals of the deep seabed. An agreement was made with other seabed mining nations and licenses were granted to four international consortia. Concurrently, the Preparatory Commission was established to prepare for the eventual coming into force of the Convention-recognized claims by applicants, sponsored by signatories of the Convention. Overlaps between the two groups were resolved, but a decline in the demand for minerals from the seabed made the seabed regime significantly less relevant. In addition, the decline of Socialism and the fall of Communism in the late 1980s had removed much of the support for some of the more contentious Part XI provisions.
In 1990, consultations were begun between signatories and non-signatories (including the United States) over the possibility of modifying the Convention to allow the
industrialized countries to join the Convention. The resulting 1994 Agreement on Implementation was adopted as a binding international Convention. It mandated that key articles, including those on limitation of seabed production and mandatory technology transfer, would not be applied, that the United States, if it became a member, would be guaranteed a seat on the Council of the International Seabed Authority, and finally, that voting would be done in groups, with each group able to block decisions on substantive matters. The 1994 Agreement also established a Finance Committee that would originate the financial decisions of the Authority, to which the largest donors would automatically be members and in which decisions would be made by consensus.
U.S. Debate
In the United States there is vigorous debate over the ratification of the treaty, with
criticism coming mainly from political conservatives who consider involvement in some international organizations and treaties as detrimental to US national interests. A group of Republican senators, led by Jim Inhofe of Oklahoma, has blocked American ratification of the Convention, claiming that it would impinge on US sovereignty. The Bush administration, a majority of the United States Senate, and the Pentagon favor ratification. (need reference)
Arguments
Pro-ratification arguments
The environment: Oceans cover over 70 percent of the Earth. In the US, there are
laws to keep marine resources available for future generations. UNCLOS sets a legally binding international standard which aims to protect the marine wildlife and environment.
National security: The US military, which relies heavily on its ability to freely
navigate on and fly over the sea, has been a strong advocate of UNCLOS. In the absence of treaty law, the US relies on customary law that can change as states' practices change. Also, under this customary law, the Pentagon claims that countries often make unreasonable and irresponsible claims on marine territory that frustrates US military action. The US has tried to work around these claims, but without a legal framework to support them, the Pentagon believes it risks compromising its intelligence and military operations at sea.
International diplomacy and peaceful dispute resolution: The Convention offers a
peaceful way to resolve territorial and natural resource disputes through the ISA or the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, based on agreements which signatory parties have already committed to. In contrast, without ratification, the US has no peaceful recourse if another non-signatory party decides to close its straits to navigation.
It helps American businesses: Each country has exclusive rights to manage the r
esources in areas near its coast. Under the terms of UNCLOS, which maps out the boundaries of these areas, the American zone is larger than that of any other country in the world.
The size of this zone is 3.36 million square miles — bigger than the lower 48 states combined. In addition, under UNCLOS, coastal states can exercise sovereign rights over natural resources within the extended continental shelf area beyond this territory. It would also give US companies an opportunity to apply for licenses with the ISA, which manages claims to resources in the deep seabed,
an area over which no country has sovereign rights.
Anti-ratification arguments
National sovereignty: The treaty creates the International Seabed Authority (ISA) with its own dispute resolution tribunal. However, should the US stop its current
compliance with the US-negotiated laws of the Convention, the U.S. could not be taken to the Law of the Sea Tribunal since the U.S. has indicated that it would choose binding arbitration rather than availing itself of the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea.
The environment: Some of the Convention's conservation provisions would provide
new avenues for non-US environmental organizations to affect domestic US environmental policies by pursuing legal action in both US and international courts.[4] In addition, requirements that nations either harvest their entire allowable catch in certain areas or give the surplus to other nations could result in mandated overfishing.[5]
Taxation: The license fees and taxes levied on economic activities in the deep seabed area by the ISA would be, in effect, a form of 'taxation without representation'. Citizens would be indirectly taxed through business and governmental activities in the area.
Economics: Businesses can already exploit resources from the international area;
ratifying the treaty would force them to buy licenses for that right and pay taxes on the proceeds.
Navigation rights not threatened: One of the treaty's main selling points, legally
recognized navigation rights on, over, and under straits, is unnecessary because these rights are not currently threatened by law or by any military capable of opposing the US.
Harm to de-militarizing operations: The treaty would require all unmanned ocean
vessels, including submarines used for mine detection to protect ships exercising the right of innocent passage, to navigate on the surface in territorial waters to be entitled to the right of innocent passage. The operative language is identical to that contained in the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone to which the U.S. is already a party.[4]
No control over funding: The treaty gives a blank check to the UN, funded by the US. The US would have no control over how the money is used.
Eminent domain: The treaty applies eminent domain to intellectual property giving
the UN the power to seize technology and share it with potentially enemy states.
Lack of need: The U.S. already honors almost all the provisions of the treaty. For
practical purposes, there is no pressing need to ratify it that outweighs the negatives of the remaining provisions. Any perceived benefit of an improved U.S. image worldwide is likely to be illusory.
Latest developments
On April 24, 2004 Jeane Kirkpatrick (Reagan Administration United Nations Ambassador 1981-1985), testified against United States ratification of the treaty before the
Senate Armed Services Committee, in which she argued that "Viewed from the perspective of U.S. interests and Reagan Administration principles, it was a bad bargain," and that "its ratification will diminish our capacity for self-government, including, ultimately, our capacity for self-defense." [6]
On April 11, 2006, the 5-Member UNCLOS Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal, presided over
by H.E. Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, rendered after two years of international judicial proceedings, the landmark Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, which resolved the maritime boundary delimitation (in the East, Central and West sectors) to satisfaction of both Parties and committed Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago to resolve their fisheries dispute by means of concluding a new Fisheries Agreement.
On May 15, 2007, President Bush announced that he had urged the Senate to approve the UNCLOS.[7] ] On October 31, 2007, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted 17-4 to send the treaty to the full U.S. Senate for a vote.[8]
On September 20, 2007, an Arbitral Tribunal constituted under UNCLOS issued its
decision on a longstanding maritime boundary dispute between Guyana and Suriname, which contained a ruling blaming both nations for violating treaty obligations.[9]
General
Legal comments on ratifications of UNCLOS III convention on the law of the sea
NELSON L.,
Declarations, Statements and 'Disguised Reservations' with Respect to the
Convention on the Law of the Sea, in: International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 2001, 767-786; CHURCHILL R., United Kingdom: Accession to the UN Convention on the Law of the sea, in: The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 1998, n°2, 263-273; LARSON D. e.a.
An Analysis of the Ratification of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, in: Ocean Development & International Law, 1995, n°3, 287-303; ANDERSON D.,
Legal Implications of the Entry Into Force of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, in: International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1995, 313-326.
Pro-treaty resources
"Time to Ratify the Law of the Sea" Don Kraus, Vice President of Government Relations for Citizens for Global Solutions, in Foreign Policy in Focus, June 6, 2007.
http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4286.
"Take ACTION to Help Us Ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty" Citizens for Global
Solutions, June 7, 2007. http://www.globalsolutions.org/node/728.
President Bush Supports the Law of the Sea Convention, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs letter to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 2007 February 8.
Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago and XXVII UNRIAA 147 and Award Series
Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Analysis and Award's Map and Lathrop's Map and 22 IJMCL 7-60 2007 and 2008 Revision and NILOS Articles and 37 GWILR pp.573-620 2007 No.3 and Catalogue
The Senate Should Give Immediate Advice and Consent to the Law of the Sea
Convention: Why the Critics Are Wrong MOORE J. and SCHACHTE W., in Columbia Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 59 Issue 1.
"The Law of the Sea Convention: The Case for Senate Action," Senator Richard Lugar, Address at Brookings Institute, 2004 May 4.
http://www.brook.edu/comm/events/20040504lugar.htm
"Evaluating the Impact of the Law of the Sea Treaty on Future Offshore Drilling,
" Paul Kelly, Senior Vice President, Rowan Companies, Inc., Global Offshore Drilling 2005 Conference, 2005 April 19.
http://www.clgd.org/downloads/unclos/GlobOffDrlg05.pdf
"The Law of the Sea Convention: A National Security Success," Commander James
Kraska, Symposium in Remembrance of Louis B. Sohn, The George Washington University School of Law, 2006 October 24.
http://www.clgd.org/downloads/Kraska_LOS_24Oct06.pdf
"Ocean Treaty Good for US," David Sandalow, The Washington Times, 2004 May 16.
"Another Side of the Sea Treaty Debate," Professor Bernard Oxman, The Washington Times, 2005 April 5.
http://www.clgd.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=129&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0
"How the Law of the Sea Convention Benefits the United States," Benjamin Friedman and Daniel Freidman, Bipartisan Study Group, 2004 November 20. http://www.gsinstitute.org/docs/11-20-04_UNCLOS.pdf
"A U.N. Treaty We Can All Support," Captain George Galdorisi, USN(Ret.), Naval I
nstitute Proceedings, 2003 March, pp. 74-77. http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA457971&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf
Anti-treaty resources
Law of the Sea Treaty Information Center http://www.unlawoftheseatreaty.org
Ridenour, David A. "Ratification of the Law of the Sea Treaty: A Not-So-Innocent
Passage," National Center for Public Policy Research, August 2006http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA542LawoftheSeaTreaty.html
Rabkin, Jeremy. "The Law of the Sea Treaty: A Bad Deal for America," Competitive
Enterprise Institute, June 1, 2006 http://www.cei.org/pdf/5352.pdfEdwin Meese, III, Baker Spring and Brett D. Schaefer, "The United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea: The Risks Outweigh the Benefits," The Heritage Foundation, May 16, 2007 http://www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/wm1459.cfmDonovan, Carrie E. "The Law of the Sea Treaty," Heritage Foundation, April 2, 2004
http://www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/wm470.cfm
Gaffney, Frank. Deep-Six this Treaty Washington Times, February 24, 2004
Cohen, Bonner. "Law of the Sea Treaty Could Prove Dangerous to America," National Center for Public Policy Research, November 2005
http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA534LawofSea.html
Schlafly, Phyllis. "Deep-Six the Law of the Sea," Townhall.com, May 21, 2007
http://www.townhall.com/columnists/PhyllisSchlafly/2007/05/21/deep-six_the_law_of_the_sea
Gaffney, Frank. LOST at Sea Washington Times, May 4, 2004
'Gaffney, Frank. 'Protect U.S. Sovereignty: Sink the Law of the Sea Treaty] Human
Events Online, January 28, 2005 http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=6431Buchanan, Patrick J. Should the U.N. Be Lord of the Oceans? February 28, 2005
http://www.theamericancause.org/a-pjb-050228-lordoftheoceans.htm
North, Oliver. Trojan Horse Sea Law Washington Times, April 3, 2005
References
^ "Overview - Convention & Related Agreements".
^ "Chronological lists of ratifications of". Retrieved on 2008-07-26.
^ http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/table_summary_of_claims.pdf
^ a b Ratification of the Law of the Sea Treaty: A Not-So-Innocent Passage
^ Amy Ridenour's National Center Blog: Bush Administration Law of the Sea Treaty Defense Inaccurate
^ http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2004/April/Kirkpatrick.pdf
^ President's Statement on Advancing U.S. Interests in the World's Oceans
^ Drawbaugh, Kevin (October 31, 2007). "U.S. Senate panel backs Law of the Sea treaty", Reuter.
^ http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1147 Guyana/Suriname (official site of the Permanent Court of Arbitration). From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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